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SEPARATE TO UNITE:
WILL CHANGE TO WIN STRENGTHEN ORGANIZED
LABOR IN AMERICA?
KEITH J. GROSS
INTRODUCTION
In 1956, union members accounted for 32 percent of the
private sector workforce in the United States.' Today, organized
labor's share of the private sector workforce is about eight percent
- a considerable drop in less than 40 years. 2 There are many
reasons for the decline in organized labor, including globalization,
unfriendly labor laws and politicians, offshoring, and hostile
employers. Aside from those factors, one key explanation for
unions' troubles is a lack of organizing. Starting in the 1950s,
unions made a conscious decision to reduce expenditures on union
organization. 3 Though this choice may have been a reaction to the
pro-business political and economic environment developing in the
United States, the fact remains that organizing efforts decreased
and unionization rates and union density, i.e., share of the labor
market, withered away.
At the start of 2005, the following question still remained:
What did unions have to do in order to reverse the decline of
organized labor? The United States' largest labor federation, the
13.6 million-member AFL-CIO, did not have a clear solution.
However, Andrew L. Stem (better known as Andy Stem),
president of the AFL-CIO affiliate Service Employees
International Union ("SEIU"), believed he had the answer - simply
stated, organize. The AFL-CIO did not flat out disagree with
Stem's suggestions to increase organizing expenditures and use
innovative organizing strategies, but did not embrace them to the
same degree as Stem and his supporters. As a result, Stem led the
creation of a new labor federation known as Change to Win
Mike Healey, The House of Labor Divided - AFL-CIO and Change to Win,
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER

(Nat'l Laws. Guild, Oakland,

Cal.),
Oct. 2005, at 1.
2
1d.
3 James B. Atleson, Law and Union Power: Thoughts.on the United States and
Canada,42 BUFF. L. REV. 463, 488 (1994) [hereinafter Atleson, Union Power].
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("CTW"). 4

Besides SEIU, CTW now includes six other unions: the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, UNITE HERE, United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union ("UFCW"),
Laborers' International Union of North America ("LIUNA"),
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and
United Farm Workers. 5 The seven Change to Win unions have
promised to organize the millions of unorganized workers in the
United States, 6 mostly in the low-wage service industries, and
increase union density.7 With Change to Win in its nascent form,
however, it is unclear what effect the split in organized labor will
have on American workers and unions.
Many onlookers doubt CTW's ability to organize and
change organized labor's fate, just as people did in the 1930s when
the Congress of Industrial Organizations ("CIO") broke away from
the craft-based American Federation of Labor ("AFL") to pursue
industrial unionism. In the early 1930s, the AFL had failed to
capitalize on the opportunity to organize the millions of
unrepresented workers in industries such as steel, auto, and
rubber. 8 John L. Lewis, who helped form the Committee for
Industrial Organization in 1935 (later changed to Congress of
Industrial Organizations), 9 believed that only a powerful,
organized group of workers could improve labor's economic and
political status.10 Through industrial unionism, CIO-affiliated
4 Healey,

supra note 1, at 1.
Id.
6 Steven Greenhouse, Breakaway Unions Start New Federation,N.Y. TIMES,
5

Sept. 28, 2005, at A17, available at
http://www.teamster.org/05news/hn_050928 4.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
7 Aaron Bernstein, Can This Man Save Labor?, Bus. WK., Sept. 13, 2004
[hereinafter Bernstein, Save Labor].
s ROBERT H. ZIEGER & GILBERT J. GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN
UNIONS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 62 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS].
Id. at 83-84.

9

1o MELVYN DUBOFSKY & WARREN VAN TINE, JOHN L. LEWIS: A BIOGRAPHY
206 (Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co. 1977) [hereinafter
DUBOFSKY].
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unions achieved unprecedented gains in the workplace, I I and, in
less than two years, the CIO succeeded in doubling union
membership and union density in the United States.12
Similarly, Change to Win seeks to organize the millions of
workers in the unorganized service industries, including health
care, retail, and food preparation; in other words, "jobs that can't
be offshored or digitized...,,1 Despite hostile employers opposed
to unionization and weak labor laws, the Change to Win affiliates,
such as SEIU and UNITE HERE, have achieved organizing
victories in the past through neutrality and card check agreements,
and should be able to strengthen workers' rights and organized
labor in the future.
This paper will discuss the historical factors that led to the
creation of the CIO, and will compare those circumstances to the
environment that brought about the formation of Change to Win in
2005. Moreover, this paper will compare the organizing strategies
of the CIO in the 1930s with those of the newly-formed Change to
Win federation, in order to determine whether Change to Win can
replicate the CIO's organizing success. Through this comparison,
it will be seen that CTW is in many ways different from the CIO
and may not have the overwhelming impact that the CIO did on
unionization rates and union density in the 1930s. Despite these
differences, this paper will argue that CTW will play an important
role in reviving organized labor and will have a positive impact on
11See GALL, AMERICAN
12

WORKERS, supra note 8, at 86-90.
Jack Metzgar, Is This the Second Coming of the CIO?,NEW LAB. F., Summer

2005, at 12.
13 David Moberg, The Lay of Labor's New Land: As the Change to Win
Federation takes shape, questions about how it will co-exist with the AFL-CIO
remain, IN THESE TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at 25 [hereinafter Moberg, Labor's
New Land]; Memorandum from James P. Hoffa, General President, and C.
Thomas Keegel, General Secretary-Treasurer, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, to Teamsters Local Union Leaders and Joint Councils, regarding
Change to Win Founding Convention 6 (Sept. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.wrgca.com/downloads/PDF%20Files%2005/CTW%20meeting%20a
nnouc.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
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American workers and unionism, just like the CIO did when it split
from the AFL.
I. THE WOES OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE 1920S AND 1930s

The American Federation of Labor was founded in 1886 as
a federation of national and international craft unions. 14 By
organizing skilled craft workers, the AFL managed to expand its
membership from under 300,000 in 1898 to over four million by
1919.15 After World War I, however, unionism and the AFL's
membership started to decline. 16
Many factors can be credited for the decline of unions
The expansion of industry and the
during the 1920s. 17
mechanization of work resulted in a substantial degree of
unemployment and the transformation of the concept of traditional
The expanding industries, including auto, utilities,
skills.' 8
chemicals and rubber, were openly anti-union and developed19
strategies, such as the company union, to frustrate true unionism.
Employers harbored strong anti-union animus, advocating a
concept known as the "American Plan" - a shop which did not deal
with unions. 20 The position of U.S. Steel's executive committee
best represents employers' hostile position on unionism:
That we are unalterably opposed to any extension of
union labor and advise subsidiary companies to take
a firm position when these questions come up, and
14 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 23-24; see generally PHILIP
TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 113-15 (Harper & Row

1964).

15GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 19.
16See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

WORKER 1920-1933 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1960) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN,
LEAN YEARS].

Id. at 87-89.
89, 506.
19 Id. at 88, 89. A company union has been defined as a labor organization,
17

18 Id. at

created by an employer, "whose structure and function are essentially
determined by management." Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995
(1992).
20
TAFT, supranote 14, at 364.
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say that they are not going to recognize it; that is,
any extension of unions in mills where they do not
now exist; that great care should be used to prevent
trouble; and that they promptly report and confer
with this corporation.
Moreover, the courts tended to intervene on behalf of employers,
granting injunctions against unions that went out on strike and
supporting yellow-dog contracts,2 2 i.e., an employment contract
forbidding membership in a labor union.2 3 In addition, the social
climate reflected President Calvin Coolidge's famous saying, "The
business of America is business," with businessmen possessing
strong political influence. 24 Business interests in the United States
were complemented by an American philosophy that stressed
individualism, symbolized in part by Horatio Alger's "rags to
riches" stories, which suggested that lower-class individuals could
rise up in society through hard work and luck.2 5
Throughout the 1920s, the AFL attempted to counteract the
opposition unions faced, but without much success. For example,
in 1919 the AFL-affiliate Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel
and Tin Workers of America ("AA") organized a steel strike of
over 350,000 workers in hopes of convincing U.S. Steel to
recognize the union and agree to collective bargaining. 26 U.S.
Steel refused to discuss the AA's demands, and simply responded
by bringing in strikebreakers - both white and black - and
27
suppressing the strikers with private guards and police.
Thereafter, AFL organizing efforts remained stagnant in the
21 Id.

at 194.

22

BERNSTEIN, LEAN YEARS, supra note 16, at 89.

23

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (7th ed. 1999).
BERNSTEIN, LEAN YEARS, supra note 16, at 88.

24

25 id.
26

TAFT, supra note 14, at 356-57.

27 Id. at 357, 358.
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1920s. 28 At the same time, the existing AFL unions which were
"industrial in structure," like the International Ladies Garment
Workers' Union ("ILGWU"), 29 were "torn asunder by competition
from non-union shops ... 30 While the ILGWU and other AFL
industrial-based unions, including the United Mine Workers
("UMW") and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
("ACW"), declined in the 1920s, the AFL craft unions managed to
maintain or increase membership and strengthen their power,
especially in the building and printing trades. 3 As a result, craft
unions - and their conservative outlook on the labor movement came to dominate AFL policy, and the AFL did not adapt its
organizational structure of craft unionism to organize the growing
number of industrial workers. 32 By 1933,33 AFL membership had
fallen to fewer than three million workers.
In some sense, organizing along craft lines was preferable
and logical in the 1920s and 1930s, because there did not exist a
supplemental pool of workers who could step in and replace craft
workers during labor disputes. As the 1919-20 steel strike
demonstrates, employers in industries with semi-skilled or
unskilled workers often can easily replace strikers, which is why
In
unskilled workers have diminished bargaining power.
comparison, workers in craft unions cannot be replaced without
difficulty, because they possess the knowledge of a specific craft
or skill that not many individuals enjoy. Due to these skills, craft
workers possess greater bargaining power than unskilled workers,
which allows skilled workers and craft unions to attain workplace
demands concerning union recognition and terms and conditions of
employment with more ease. Therefore, craft unions' success
during the 1920s and early years of the Great Depression, a time
when unemployment skyrocketed, was not that surprising.
With much unemployment and economic hardship during
28

GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 62.

29

BERNSTEIN, LEAN YEARS, supra note 16, at 86.

30 Id.
at

85.

Id. at 86.
32 Id. at 84, 86.
'

33 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 62.
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the Great Depression, the federal government responded in 1933
by passing the National Industrial Recovery Act which included
Section 7(a), a provision that guaranteed workers the right to
organize and engage in collective bargaining. 34 The main purpose
of the National Industrial Recovery Act was to "stimulate
economic recovery" from the Great Depression through a National
Recovery Administration ("NRA"), which would "[rely] on
business groups and trade associations to develop codes of fair
competition." 35 Though the Recovery Act was later declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935,36 workers and
unions capitalized on the opportunity to organize provided by the
Act. President John L. Lewis of the UMW launched an intensified
organization campaign in many areas of the anti-union bituminous
coal industry, thereby reviving local unions which had faced strong
opposition prior to the NRA and eliminating company unions. 37 In
the clothing industry, the ILGWU and the ACW benefited from the
NRA and allowed them to increase their membership and expand
their jurisdiction into other parts of the industry and other
markets. 38 Steel and iron workers, who had little success with
joined the "explosion of organizing,"
unionism in the past, also
39
signing up with the AA.
The vast expansion in organizing and growth of unions
revealed problems with the NRA and AFL bureaucracy. In 1934,
1.5 million strikers engaged in over 1,800 work stoppages - the
highest figures for strikes since the early 1920s - in an attempt to
exercise their collective bargaining rights guaranteed under the

34 TAFT, supra note 14, at 416-17.
35 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note
36

TAFT, supra note 14, at 422.

8, at 69.
The Supreme Court held that the National

Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37 TAFT, supra note 14, at 426-27.
38 Id. at 433.
39 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 71.
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National Industrial Recovery Act. 40 Both industrial workers and
whole communities became involved in the labor disputes, due to
their discontent with deficient federal enforcement of labor policy
under the Recovery Act. During work stoppages in the summer
of 1934, employers - and local and state governments - enlisted

police and national guardsmen armed with tear gas and guns to
quell unionists and their supporters, so that strikebreakers could
resume factory production. 42 Not only were the strikes put down,
but many workers were wounded and some killed in these
exchanges. 43 The unions involved in these labor disputes, such as
the United Textile Workers and Teamsters, learned that the AFL
bureaucracy "too often provided only dilatory and unresponsive
leadership" during local strikes, and that "[l]ack of solid
organization too frequently led to defeat." 44 Moreover, workers

realized that the Recovery Act was an ineffective mechanism for
enabling union organizing and collective bargaining, 45 especially
because a lack of government support for unions and police
support for employers enabled employers to break strikes and
suppress unions. Even though the federal government under
President Franklin D. Roosevelt had started to show signs of
supporting workers and unions, in hopes of recovering from the
Great Depression, an anti-worker Republican presence in
government on all levels continued to disadvantage workers when
they attempted to organize.
Notwithstanding the benefits of craft unionism related to
bargaining power, AFL unions took issue with the industrial
unionism stimulated by the National Industrial Recovery Act based
on jurisdictional grounds. Over the years, the AFL had "evolved
the principle of exclusive jurisdiction, which meant that one union
and one only would be authorized to recruit workers of a given

40

Id. at 73.

41 id.

42 Id. at

73-75.

43 Id.

44Id. at 75.
45 Id.
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craft or calling. 4 6 If workers were to pursue industrial unionism,
both skilled craftsmen and unskilled industrial workers would be
included in the same bargaining unit. 47 AFL craft unions objected
to a policy of industrial unionism, because the policy would
impinge upon their exclusive jurisdiction and take away skilled
workers that belonged in the individual craft unions. 48 Moreover,
the influx of industrial workers "in trades not easily classified
under the AFL's antiquated system of jurisdiction" confused the
AFL leadership, 49 because the semi-skilled or unskilled industrial
workers did not meet the AFL's traditional definition of craft.5°
Rather than resolve the contentious issue, the AFL leaders thought
up a temporary fix in which industrial workers were organized into
federal labor unions, organizations which violated lines of
exclusive jurisdiction and were directly operated by the AFL; in
time, AFL officials would place the industrial recruits into the
appropriate craft unions. 51 To workers in the mass production
industries, however, the AFL approach to organization made no
sense since appropriate craft unions did not exist for many
unskilled industrial workers, and because the AFL's organizing
52
method would fragment union solidarity in individual shops.
Underlying the jurisdictional debate concerning craft
unionism and industrial unionism was a negative perception of
industrial workers. Some AFL executives, representing the old
craft guard, believed "that industrial workers were not quite fit to
belong to a union," and wanted nothing to do with the industrial
form of union organization. 53 In the AFL craft leaders' view, the
TAFT, supra note 14, at 463.
41 Id. at 464.
46

48 id.
49

50

GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 71.

Id. at 71-72.

"52 Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
53 RON E. ROBERTS, JOHN L. LEWIS: HARD LABOR AND WILD JUSTICE 140

(Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co. 1994).
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unskilled industrial workers were inferior and nothing more than
"scum," and, therefore, AFL executives rejected industrial
unionism. 54 By taking this position, AFL leaders continued to
promote the "so-called aristocracy of labor," a system under which
craft workers were in power and unskilled workers were
excluded.55
II. THE CREATION OF THE CIO
Following the formation of federal labor unions and the
labor disputes of 1934, traditional union leaders within the AFL
began to speak out against the status quo, advocating groundbreaking change in the organized labor movement. 56 The main
proponent of change was John L. Lewis, president of the UMW - a
labor organization that had always recruited on an industrial
basis. 57 By 1935, Lewis had led the industrial-based UMW for
over 15 years. 58 Despite limited rank-and-file support, Lewis had
maneuvered through the UMW bureaucracy in order to arrive at
"an awesome
the top.59 The UMW president was described as 60
appearance."
physical
"larger-than-life
a
figure" with
Lewis grew dissatisfied with the AFL's main concern for
craft unionism, believing that recruiting on an industrial basis was
required to build and strengthen organized labor.6 1 At the AFL's
October 1935 Convention, Lewis advocated the need for industrial
unionism. 62 Lewis' comments created "an air of trouble[ ]" inside
the convention hall, and were not well-received by the AFL
54Id.

See also Jim Smith, The Corporatizationof Unions, L.A. LAB. NEWS (Cal.
May
2002,
L.A.
County, Cal.),
Peace
and
Freedom Party,
http://www.lalabor.org/Corporatization-of unions.html (last visited Dec. 16,
2005)(stating "unskilled workers were seen not as fellow toilers but as enemies,
inferiors and potential strikebreakers").
55 See Smith, supra note 54.
56 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8,
at 63.
57
Id. at 83.
58 Id.
59 ROBERT

Press 1995).
60

H. ZIEGER, THE CIO, 1935-1955 24 (The Univ. of North Carolina

GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS,

61
62

id.
id.

supra note 8, at 83.
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leaders. 63 Not only did union leaders harbor disgust for what they
felt were undeserving, lower-class, unskilled workers,6 4 but they
also believed that industrial unionism would be ineffective in
strengthening organized labor, based on the failures of previous
industrial unions like the Knights of Labor and Industrial Workers
of the World.65 Some AFL leaders questioned Lewis' motives for
supporting a form of unionism with a history of "unbroken
failure,"6 seeing Lewis as "a power-hungry fraud;" 67 a man with
"a certain keen instinct for power." 68 In other words, Lewis'
critics thought "the opportunity that the activism of mass
production workers offered was the opportunity Lewis saw for
aggrandizing himself in the name of the toiling masses and at least
realizing the ambitions 69
for national leadership that, he believed, his
to."
him
entitled
talents
To achieve worker and union empowerment, Lewis did not
believe workers and unions should rely only on federal legislation.
On July 5, 1935, President Roosevelt and the federal government
had again demonstrated their support for workers and unions with
the passage of the National Labor Relations (or Wagner) Act
("NLRA"), a measure designed to "encourage collective
bargaining through independent unions ...[and] guarantee a fair
procedure for determining bargaining rights. ''7u Although the
NLRA was important to the labor movement, for John L. Lewis
"government labor policy remained secondary in 1935 to the crisis
that he perceived in the labor movement itself' - deficient

63

Id. at 84.

64 See ROBERTS, supra note 53, at 140.

IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER 1933-1941 393 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1970).
66 id.
67 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 83.
68 ZIEGER, supra note 59, at 26.
69 Id.
70 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 81.
65
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organizing. 7 1 Lewis believed that the AFL had wasted the "golden
opportunity" to organize the immense mass production industries,
such as steel, auto, and rubber.72 The economic landscape was
changing, as modem industry eliminated the "traditional definition
of skill."73 Lewis recognized that the AFL's inability to organize
"the central core of American industry doomed the labor
movement to political and economic irrelevance."'7 4 Therefore,
despite the passage of the NLRA, Lewis understood that the AFL's
antiquated bureaucracy had to be challenged in order to maintain
(and augment) a political
and economic status for organized labor
75
in American society.
On November 9, 1935, Lewis assembled a meeting of AFL76
leaders eager to institute widespread industrial unionism.
Attendees of this meeting included the presidents of the ILGWU,
ACW, and the International Typographical Union ("ITU").77 At
this meeting, those unions, along with Lewis' UMW and four
smaller AFL affiliates, created a Committee for Industrial
Organization - a structure that vowed to encourage industrial
unionism while operating within the AFL.78 William Green,
president of the predominantly craft-based AFL, and other AFL
leaders denounced the CIO, asserting it 79as a rival union that
threatened the established labor movement.
The CIO remained a part of the AFL until it adopted a
constitution in November 1938, at which time the CIO changed its
name to Congress of Industrial Organizations and broke all ties

71

Id. at 82. Also, there was the possibility that the NLRA would eventually be

declared unconstitutional, just like the National Industrial Recovery Act. In
1937, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA was constitutional in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
72 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note
8, at 83.
73

ld.

74 Id.
75 Id.
71 Id.

at 84.

77 id.

78 id.
79

1d. at 85.
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with the AFL. 80 The CIO immediately began operating, however,
as a separate entity to organize and represent workers in industrial
unions. 81 The improving economy favored the CIO, as steel and
82
auto manufacturers expanded production and recalled workers.
In two notorious anti-union industries - auto and steel - the CIO
took on two large, anti-union employers and won historic
83
organizing victories, which sparked a wave of mass organization.
The first great victory in the auto industry involved a battle
between the United Automobile Workers .("UAW") and the
General Motors Corporation ("GM") in Flint, Michigan - "the
linchpin of GM's nationwide production empire." 84 Despite the
fact that only 10 percent of the GM workforce were UAW
members (about 4,700 workers), these UAW militants - some of
whom were members of the Communist Party and Socialist Party managed to disrupt operations and occupy critical GM plants for
six weeks starting on December 29, 1936.85 In addition to mass
picketing outside the factories, the UAW employed a creative
technique, the sit-down strike - "a strike in which employees
occupy [or sit-down in] the workplace but do not work" 86 - which
discouraged the typical modes of strikebreaking. 87 Some violence
erupted in early January 1937, with 24 individuals being injured in
the occupied Flint plants. 88 In anticipation of further violence,
Michigan's Democratic Governor Frank Murphy called a National
Guard regiment to duty, but directed the troops "to remain outside
80

Id.

1Id.
82 DUBOFSKY,
83 GALL,
84 Id.

5Id. at
86
87

supra note 10, at 255.

AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 87.

87, 95.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (7th ed. 1999).
GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 87. The Supreme Court later

declared the sit-down strike illegal in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240 (1939).
88 TAFT, supra note 14, at 494.
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of the strike zone." 89 That was the extent of the troops'
involvement, as the federal government and Governor
Murphy
90
insisted that the labor dispute be settled peacefully.
Although the federal government and state governments
had intervened in past labor disputes on behalf of employers, this
time around the CIO enjoyed a labor-friendly political climate that
supplemented its organizing efforts. The CIO had decided to reject
the AFL tradition of voluntarism, under which unions denounced
becoming dependent on any political party and stayed away from
politics due to suspicion that government activity would work
against union interests in the long run. 9 1 Instead, Lewis and his
CIO colleagues gave unprecedented financial support to the
Democrats, particularly President Roosevelt (i.e., politicians who
had supported the passage of the NLRA), prior to the 1936
presidential and congressional elections. 92 The CIO's decision to
support President Roosevelt and the Democrats was a product of
industrial unionism, in that transient industrial workers often
moved from place-to-place and from job-to-job and looked to the
93
government for the creation of a social welfare system.
Moreover, the CIO believed the reelection of President Roosevelt
and increased Democratic majorities in Congress would bolster the
CIO's ability to organize the millions of workers in the auto, steel,
rubber, and textile industries, whereas a Republican administration
could bolster employers' anti-union position by weakening the
NLRA. 94
Political contributions to the Democratic Party,
including $500,000 by the UMW, the largest labor contribution to
any political campaign at that time, spearheaded "a labor triumph,"
which resulted in the election of numerous Democratic state
and
95
governors.
and
officials
local
liberal
federal legislators and
With numerous Democrats in office on the federal, state,
89

id.

9Id. at 496.

91GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supranote 8, at
92

1d. at 86.

9'
94 Id. at 94-95.

Id. at 86.

95 id.

94.
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and local levels, a new political and social climate existed to the
benefit of labor organizations, in particular the CIO. 96 Besides
Governor Murphy in Michigan, Democratic governors had been
elected in key steel states, such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
and Illinois. 97 Unlike their predecessors, these Democratic
governors were likely to sympathize with organized labor, and
would not intervene on behalf of the corporations in labor
disputes. 98 Moreover, the so-called LaFollette Commission had
been created by the U.S. Senate in 1936 to probe suspected
employer violations of employees' rights. 99 The committee's
investigation into the "use of espionage, stockpiling of arms and
munitions, and the domination of local authorities by anti-labor
corporations .. .attracted great public attention and provided a
support for labor's organizing efforts rarely
sense of governmental
100
seen before."'
The CIO's political action proved worthwhile and effective
in the Flint strike. President Roosevelt and other federal officials
criticized General.Motors' refusal to negotiate with the UAW.''
Moreover, Roosevelt endorsed Governor Murphy's nonviolent
approach to resolving the labor dispute, in part because of the
financial support the CIO had given to the Democratic Party, but
more so because he believed a peaceful settlement would result in
political credit to all New Deal Democrats. 02 As a result of this
political backing, John L. Lewis was able to bring irritated GM
executives to the bargaining table, and, in the second week of
February 1937, the UAW and GM finally agreed upon a one-page
contract. 103
Although the contract contained few concrete
96

ld.at 89.

97 Id.; ZIEGER, supra note 59, at 40.
98 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note
99 Id.
1ooId.
101
DUBOFSKY,
102

Id. at 267.

103 GALL,

8, at 89.

supra note 10, at 265.

AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8,

at 88.
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concessions for GM workers, it did contain "the critical stipulation:
as bargaining agent for
the company agreed to recognize the0 UAW
4
its members in the struck facilities."'
A month after the Flint strike ended, the CIO prevailed in
its confrontation with the steel industry.' 0 5 Since the steel industry
had a history of violent resistance to unionism, the CIO knew
10 6
organizing the steel companies would be no easy task.
Considering the past practice of union opposition, large
corporations like U.S. Steel, "which in the mid-1930s held about
40 percent of the nation's steel producing capacity and employed
over 220,000 workers," were expected to fight the CIO's
To bring unionism to the 500,000
organizing tactics 10 7
steelworkers in the United States and counteract the steel
created the Steel
companies' union avoidance tactics, Lewis
10 8
Workers Organizing Committee ("SWOC").
In the industrial confrontation with the steel companies,
SWOC employed innovative organizing strategies such as
"supporting CIO militants in company-sponsored unions." 10 9 By
1935, union sympathizers had infiltrated, through the established
election processes, U.S. Steel's company union and other company
unions, which were "designed primarily to undercut true labor
unions."1 10 The company unions proceeded to attack management
policies, therefore becoming a vehicle for worker empowerment
SWOC's presence weakened the
rather than a form of control.'
steel companies' bargaining position:
Throughout 1936 and 1937, local activists
constantly pressed the steel companies for wage and
other concessions, demands that put the employers
in a double bind. If they granted concessions,
104 id.
105 Id.

116Id. at 89.
107 Id. at 88.
108Id. at 86.
109 Id.

110Id. at

111Id.

89.
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SWOC members in the company unions escalated
their demands and claimed that the companies were
only trying to buy off union sentiment. If the
companies turned a deaf ear, CIO supporters argued
that only SWOC could force the steelmakers to
come around. 12
Moreover, SWOC enlisted communist organizers, who were
known to be willing to do whatever
was necessary to bring
3
workers."
unorganized
to
unionism
The chairman of U.S. Steel's board, Myron Taylor,
recognized that numerous steelworkers were signing up with
SWOC and that company unions were asserting their
independence. 114 Further, political candidates aligned with the
steel industry's interests had been defeated by Democratic labor
supporters in the 1936 elections, including in states and local
communities that steel companies had long dominated. 1 5 With
militant SWOC members backed by the government, a national
steel strike seemed very possible, "and if it came, [steel]
executives
' 116
it."
smash
to
state
the
of
power
the
on
rely
not
could
Due to the threat posed by SWOC efforts within company
unions and in the steel mills and the changing political
environment, Myron Taylor decided that the time had come to
recognize organized labor.' 17 Through secret negotiations between
Taylor and John L. Lewis, the CIO-affiliate SWOC and U.S. Steel
established an agreement which "conceded recognition of SWOC

112

113

Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 95; HOWARD

KIMELDORF, REDS OR RACKETS?: THE MAKING OF

RADICAL AND CONSERVATIVE UNIONS ON THE WATERFRONT 10

Press 1988).

114 DUBOFSKY,
115Id.
116 Id. at 276.
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by the steel corporation."' 1 8 Similar to the GM-UAW agreement,
modest concessions in wages and other terms and conditions of
employment were obtained by SWOC, although the contract did
create a grievance procedure - "an important factor in giving
SWOC locals a day-to-day presence in the mills." ' 19 Nevertheless,
once again a "fledging union had compelled an enormously
powerful corporation to deal with its representatives and to
acknowledge the right
of its members to a contractual relationship
'' 2
with the company. 0
The CIO's organizing efforts also included a focus on
recruiting black workers.' 2 1 Significant numbers of blacks worked
in CIO-targeted industries including steel, meatpacking, auto, and
garment. 122 For years, the AFL had disregarded and discriminated
against black workers, which caused blacks to regard the organized
labor movement, including the new CIO, with suspicion. 1 23 CIO
leaders and organizers understood that they had to address black
workers' hostility towards unions if they wanted to build and
strengthen the CIO, because blacks working at industrial plants
performed key tasks in the production process. 124 Moreover,
excluding blacks from the CIO's organizing strategy could cause
problems for the CIO, as blacks not involved in the production
25
process represented a source of potential strikebreakers.'
Therefore, the CIO targeted, with success, the recruitment of black
workers by employing new organizing approaches, such as
enlisting 2churches
and black fraternal organizations on behalf of
6
the CIO. 1
A unique and controversial aspect of CIO organizing was
the inclusion of "anticapitalist radicals," including communists and
118Id.
119
120

1d.

Id.

121 See

id. at 92-93.
supra note 59, at 83.

122 ZIEGER,
123

GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at

124

Id. at 93.

125
id.
126

Id.; ZIEGER, supra note 59, at 84.

92-93.
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socialists. 127 Though communists had abandoned the "boringfrom-within" policy, which had been used in their attempt to
dominate organized labor prior to World War I, the policy
reemerged in 1934, and the advent of the CIO provided the ideal
opportunity for communists to exercise the "boring-from-within"
strategy.12 8 "Unstable conditions - unemployment, low wages,
poor working conditions .. .[and] weak union organization" 1 before and during the Great Depression also provided communists
and other radicals, who "collectively offered a vision that could, in
their view, fundamentally transform the whole society,"' 30 the
opportunity to infuse themselves into the organized labor
movement. 131
Lewis and other veteran unionists understood that the CIO
unions lacked experienced organizers who could rally worker
support for unions, due to the hard times organized labor had gone
through in the 1920s and early 1930s. 132 Because of this dilemma,
the CIO did not turn communists and socialists away - even
though employers and the AFL condemned the CIO's association
with communists and other radicals - but rather welcomed them
because "[such] radicals were often among the most energetic,
committed, and effective organizers."' 133 In comparison to the
average workers, communists were more willing to confront
employer discrimination and violence and to work day and night
on organizing campaigns, plus they were indifferent to being fired
127

GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supranote 8, at 95.

TAFT, supra note 14, at 618-19. By "boring-from-within," communists
attempted to take control over labor unions so that the unions could be used as a
vehicle to advance the Communist Party's agenda.
128

129

DAVID J. SAPOSS, COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN UNIONS 109 (McGraw-Hill

Book Co., Inc. 1959).
30 Jerry Tucker, A New Labor Federation Claims Its Space: If Enthusiasm on
Display Were Substance, CtW Could Claim a Good Start, MONTHLY REV., Apr.
10, 2005, available at http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/tucker04l005.html.
131 SAPOSS, supranote 129, at 109.
132 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supranote 8, at 95.
133 Id.; TAFT, supra note 14, at
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34
- all of which made them successful organizers.1
Opinions differ on whether communists "infiltrated" and
"captured" leadership positions within the CIO, or if rank-and-file
support and organizing results allowed communists to become
influential CIO leaders. 135 Regardless of how communists within
the CIO were perceived, Lewis dismissed concerns about the
relationship between the CIO and communists because
36
communists "knew how to organize" and did so successfully.'
Even communists' harshest critics admit that communists were
137
more effective organizers than traditional labor leaders.
Moreover, Lewis was able to shrug off outside attacks regarding
communists, given that the Communist Party "seemed to be
cooling its revolutionary ardor" in the late 1930s,' 38 advocating an
anti-Facist policy in response to the threat of Nazi aggression. 13
By 1937, CIO membership had surpassed the four million
mark - a result of creative organizing and political action. 140 In
about two years, 6,000 new local unions had been formed, 14 1 and
the CIO had succeeded in doubling union membership and union
density in the United States. 142 CIO organizers had turned down
hundreds of requests for CIO charters in order to concentrate on
organizing the basic industries; but still, CIO affiliates integrated
all kinds of workers
- bank tellers, clerks, waitresses - into their
143
local unions.

III. FACTORS LEADING TO THE AFL-CIO MERGER
Observing the significant gains the CIO had achieved with
industrial organization, the AFL began to reform its organizing
strategies. The AFL extended recruitment efforts in industries
134 KIMELDORF,
115 Id.

supra note 113, at 10.

at 9.

GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 95.
137 KIMELDORF, supra note 113, at 10.
136
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14, at 620.
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id.
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such as meatpacking, food processing, the service trades, and retail
work, successfully organizing industrial workers that were targets
of the CIO.144 The AFL's established institutional structure, with
central bodies in most cities and state federations, provided AFL
organizers with greater political, legal, and organizing resources
than those available to the CIO - a clear advantage for the AFL in
competition for members with the CIO.' 4 5 By 1939, AFL
membership had surpassed CIO membership; the AFL claimed
members while the CIO estimated its membership at
over 4 million
146
million.
3.5
As the AFL regained its share of the labor market, the CIO
faced various setbacks that revealed limitations in CIO organizing
and collective bargaining efforts. Despite the impressive CIO
victories in the steel and auto industries, the CIO failed to organize
smaller steel corporations (known as "Little Steel") and large auto
companies like Ford. 147 The incomplete organization in areas such
as auto and steel encouraged emp loyers to resist bargaining and
Employer hostility towards
respond to strikes with force. 14
collective bargaining and unions, coupled with ineffective union
leadership, led rank-and-file unionists in the auto industry to
conduct "innumerable strikes and sit-downs," and steelworkers
became reluctant to support and pay dues to SWOC, which could
not organize Little Steel. 149 In addition, although communist
organizers had helped to expand union membership, by 193850
communists had secured "major strategic positions in the CIO,"'
and critics feared that the CIO was becoming an appendage of the
Communist Party.' 5 '
4 Id. at 99.

145 id.

146 Id. at 99, 102.
17 Id. at 96-97.

148 id.
49
1 Id. at 98.

supra note 14, at 620.
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After the explosion in organizing spurred by the CIO in the
late 1930s, organized labor again faced problems and resistance.
When the United States entered World War II following the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt urged for
labor-management cooperation during the war effort. 152 The AFL
and CIO heeded the call and agreed to support the cooperative
program that took form in the National War Labor Board. 53 The
board was an entity designed for the purpose of "adjusting and
settling labor disputes which might interrupt work which
contributes to the effective prosecution of the war," and later to
stabilize wages.'154 The board, however, was unable to prevent
work stoppages, especially after President Roosevelt issued two
executive orders in late 1942 and early 1943, which restricted
wage modifications without approval of the board.155 In response
to the wage freezes associated with the executive orders, organized
labor reneged on its no-strike
pledge, and workers engaged in
56
numerous work stoppages.'
Towards the end of World War II, the number of workers
on strike rose, and the increase in work stoppages only continued
after the war concluded. 57 In addition to a sharp rise in labor
disputes, "[t]he expansion of union membership brought with it
new problems," such as the "refusal of some unions to bargain in
good faith" and "the use of the secondary boycott.'' 58 Due to
organized labor's activities, a public demand developed for some
corrective action.1 59 In 1947, a Republican majority in Congress
helped pass the Taft-Hartley Act, an amendment to the NLRA,
152TAFT,
5

supra note 14, at 546.

1 3 Id.

154Id. at

546, 547.

Id. at 551-54. In the fall of 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order
9250, which "prohibit[ed] wage changes without the approval of the War Labor
Board." Id. at 551. On April 8, 1943, President Roosevelt issued Executive
Order 9328, "which limited wage increases to cases where they were necessary
to correct substandards of living." Id. at 553.
155

156

Id. at 553-54.
553-54, 579.
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118Id. at
159 Id.

579.

2005-2006

Separate to Unite

over the veto of Democratic President Harry S. Truman.' 6' The
Taft-Hartley Act weakened organized labor by making it illegal for
a union to refuse to bargain in good faith, outlawing the secondary
boycott, and including a provision for a decertification election if
30 percent of workers in a bargaining unit petitioned the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB").161
In the late 1940s, the CIO was further weakened by internal
division caused by an anti-communist movement in the United
States. Towards the end of World War II, communists within and
outside the CIO proceeded to attack the labor movement, United
States government, and democratic nations. 162 CIO officials
recognized that 18 unions in the CIO were under communist
control. 163 Although individual unions traditionally were allowed
to pursue their own policies and political views, the CIO saw
communist union officials and members as a severe problem
because "[c]ommunists had been shown to be ready to sacrifice the
interests of their own members and the country and its people
when it suited the ends of the Soviet Union."' 164 As a result of the
anti-communist wave that spread through the United States during
the Cold War, the CIO expelled 11 left-wing unions with a total
membership of one million workers in 1950 for "following the
Communist Party line. .. ,,165 After the expulsion of communistdominated affiliates, CIO organizing "ground to a halt" and major
CIO unions experienced little or no Membership growth; plus, the
CIO abandoned its "ideological fervor" and drifted away from the
political left. 1 66 It would appear that the removal of fervent union
activists from the organized labor movement, due to the anti60

1

161

Id. at 579, 583.
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McCarthyism, hindered
communist ideology promoted by
67
1
growth.
union
and
efforts
organizing
In 1952, in light of the changing conditions in society and
within the labor movement, the groundwork was laid for reuniting
the AFL and CIO. With the deaths of CIO president Philip Murray
and AFL president William Green, the past conflict between the
AFL and CIO began to dissipate.' 68 The new AFL president,
George Meany, had encouraged industrial unionism in the 1930s
when most AFL leaders had rejected it and understood the
importance of political action; therefore, Meany's economic and
political views resembled those of the CIO. 169 The AFL was also
"a good deal healthier" than the CIO by the early 1950s, as most
CIO unions were dependent on financial subsidies from the CIO
and struggled for existence.170 When the 1952 elections resulted in
the selection of Dwight Eisenhower, the first Republican president
since 1933, and Republican majorities in the House of
Representatives and Senate, George Meany and Walter Reuther,
the new president of the CIO, foresaw the need for a unified labor
movement and began merger discussions. 17 1 In December 1955,
the AFL and CIO merged to form the modem day AFL-CIO, thus
ending a twentylYear period of separation within the organized
labor movement.
IV.

THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE

AFL-CIO

AND CHANGE TO WIN

COALITION

Around the same time of the AFL-CIO merger in 1955,
American unions began their decline. Although there are many
possible explanations for the decline of unionization in the United
States, including changes to the NLRA and the application of labor
law, one relevant factor for union decline was a decrease in

167
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organizing expenditures in the 1950s.173 Unions like the AFLCIO, whose leadership and members consisted of mostly white
males, were not well-positioned to organize the women and
minorities in the growing service sector and southern
manufacturing. 174
With labor's inability and disinterest in
organizing these industries, private sector unionization levels went
from 32 percent in the mid-1950s to eight percent in 2005.175
At the start of 2005, the AFL-CIO had a membership of
over 13.6 million workers. 176 AFL-CIO affiliates included the
SEIU (1.8 million members), Teamsters (1.4 million members),
UNITE HERE (440,000 members), UFCW (1.4 million members),
and LIUNA (800,000 members). In accordance with the AFL-CIO
Constitution, each affiliated national union was required to make a
per capita tax payment of 65 cents per member each month to the
AFL-CIO starting in July 2005.177
Under this financial
arrangement, these five unions would be required to pay over $39
million to the AFL-CIO in annual dues. Much of this money and
the AFL-CIO's $100 million budget 178 would be spent on the AFLCIO's political lobbying activities at the federal level and little on
organizing. 179 Traditionally, the AFL-CIO allocates roughly onequarter of its budget to organizing, as indicated by the $22.5
million the AFL-CIO had budgeted for organizing in 2005.180 In
comparison, the SEIU devotes about half of its international budget
173
74

Atleson, Union Power, supra note 3, at 488.

1 Id.

175Healey,

supra note 1, at 1.
See U.S. Dep't of Labor, http://erds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (last
visited Dec. 20, 2005). To see the specific information for the AFL-CIO, select
"AFLCIO" for the union abbreviation and "International" for the union type.
177 AFL-CIO
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available at
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or $50 million annually for membership growth, with the SEIU
locals contributing another $130 million for organizing."'
Half a century after the effectuation of the AFL-CIO
merger, the 13.6 million-member AFL-CIO was set to hold its
"50 ' Anniversary Convention" in Chicago, Illinois from July 2528, 2005. Instead of being an opportunity for the AFL-CIO's 13.6
million members to celebrate the federation's 50 years of existence
and discuss normal collective bargaining issues, the convention
turned out to be of even greater significance for the organized
labor movement. On July 25, 2005, SEIU and the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters - two large and powerful unions -

resigned from the AFL-CIO, taking with them more than three
million members and leading the charge for other unions to follow
suit. 182 The departure of the SEIU and the Teamsters represented
"the culmination of more than three years' work in building an
insurgency" by Andy Stern, "president of the fast-growing
SEIU."' 183 Stern and other labor leaders, such as Teamster
president James Hoffa, had pushed for vast reform of the AFLCIO, in order to stop the long-term decline in union membership
1 84
accomplish.
to
unable
been
had
AFL-CIO
the
something
On June 15, 2005, a little over one month prior to the
disaffiliation of the SEIU and the Teamsters, five of the largest
AFL-CIO unions - SEIU, Teamsters, UFCW, UNITE HERE, and
LIUNA - formed the Change to Win Coalition - a new alliance

devoted to organizing "the tens of millions of workers in the
private sector who are desperate for a voice on the job." 185 About
two weeks later, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, who
disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO in 2001, joined the Change to Win
Coalition, thereby increasing the alliance's membership to 5.5
18 1
182

Bernstein, Save Labor,supra note 7.
Thomas B. Edsall, Two Top Unions Split From AFL-CIO: Others Are

Expected To Follow Teamsters, WASH.
Edsall,
Unions Split].
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86
million workers. 1
The coalition proclaimed that June 15, 2005 was "a historic
day" for the "new cooperative initiative to rebuild the American
labor movement from the ground up."' 187 Similar to the CIO in
1935, the Change to Win Coalition sought to reform the AFL-CIO
from within by submitting proposed amendments that called for
substantial modification of AFL-CIO procedures, governance, and
direction. 188 Interestingly, CTW compared the new coalition to the
CIO in the 1930s:
Just as the Committees for Industrial Organization
was formed in the 1930s when the AFL would not
embrace the kinds of structural, resource allocation,
and jurisdictional changes that were necessary to
organize the new mass production industries of the
time, the Change to Win Coalition has formed at a
time when new strategies and structures are
required to organize the growin non-union section
of our private sector economy.

Like the CIO, the Change to Win Coalition pledged to use
innovative organizing techniques - those pioneered by the
founding CTW unions - to organize190non-union workers in "key
areas of the private sector economy."'
The coalition's Restoring the American Dream Proposal,
See http://www.changetowin.org/press/Carpenters062705.html
2005).
186

The

Change

(June 27,

to
Win
Coalition
Statement,
available at
http://www.liuna.org/pubsnews/pdfs/coalitiontowin.pdf (last visited Dec. 7,
2005) [hereinafter CTW Coalition Statement].
188 See Amendments and Resolutions to Change the Federation to Win Better
Lives for Workers and Their Families Through Organizing and Maintaining
at
available
Standards,
Contract
http://www.workinglife.org/FOL/pdf/CTWconventionproposals.pdf (last visited
A ,r. 13, 2006).
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187
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called for making organizing the AFL-CIO's top priority. 19 1 Ten
years earlier, the elected AFL-CIO officers, including President
John Sweeney, had spoke of increasing organizing to reverse the
According to CTW, the AFL-CIO's
decline of unions. 192
organizing efforts and "voluntarism" were unsuccessful in
maintaining union membership, and "few inroads [had] been made
by workers in expanding sectors [of the economy],"' 193 mainly
referring to the service sectors. To capitalize on organizing
potential, CTW proposed monetary incentives for AFL-CIO unions
that "demonstrate[d] a strategy and commitment to organizing in
the core industries." This concept of "changing to grow" would
return $35-$45 million per year from the AFL-CIO budget to
individual unions dedicated to organizing the unorganized. 194 In
response, the AFL-CIO introduced a plan that would only return a
total of $15 million to such affiliated unions. 195 CTW's organizing
reforms also called for the creation of a $25 million fund for
"movement-wide campaigns" to allow organized labor "to take on
powerful anti-worker employers," like Wal-Mart.196 In response,
the AFL-CIO suggested shifting $7.5 million from
the existing
97
1
campaigns.
movement-wide
for
budget
organizing
Another concern of CTW was the overlap of unions in
The AFL-CIO had
certain sectors of the economy.' 98
commissioned studies which identified the problem of union
What's the Difference?: Restoring the American Dream vs. the AFL-CIO
Proposal, Change
to
Win
Campaign,
available at
Officers'
http://www.changetowin.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter CTW
Proposal].
'9'

Id.
'9'
Id. It is interesting that Change to Win used the word "voluntarism" to

192

describe the AFL-CIO's actions. In this situation, CTW used the term
"voluntarism" in reference to the AFL-CIO's counterproposals, which did not
obligate member unions to alter their organizing and bargaining strategies and
proposed voluntary cooperation. In comparison, the AFL's tradition of
voluntarism was related to political action.
194Id.
95
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duplication and undercutting, but, according to CTW, had not
taken any significant measures to stop these practices.199 For
instance, flight attendants in the United States "are now divided
among several different unions, making it nearly difficult, if not
impossible, for them to wield any leverage over an entire
industry." 200 CTW insisted on "tough rules prohibiting one union
from undercutting the standards won [by] union workers in an
area," and the coordination of bargaining by industry, employer or
occupation. 21 Moreover, CTW believed the AFL-CIO "should
establish financial incentives to facilitate mergers ...

that lead to

increased power for workers in the same or complementary
industries." 20 2 CTW envisioned "slash[ing] the AFL-CIO's 60
unions to 15 or 20 powerful mega-unions" to increase union
density, thereby providing unions with the power to raise wages
and improve working conditions. 203 The AFL-CIO rejected the
idea of incentives for union consolidation and mergers, instead
proposing
"encouragement of voluntary cooperation between
,&
unions."
The CTW proposal also spoke of "building political power"
to increase union membership.2 0 5
CTW recognized that
"[w]orking people cannot win consistently on political issues until
many more workers are in unions," and, therefore, suggested "a
strategic plan" to back public officials with a track record of
supporting workers who are trying to form unions, and focusing on
"critical swing states.' 20 6 This proposal was a response to the
199 Id.

200
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AFL-CIO's dependence on federal lobbying and financial
contributions to the Democratic Party, which CTW argued had not
resulted in any significant benefits for workers. 20 The AFL-CIO
did not offer any type of strategic political plan, nor did it offer to
reduce its political expenditures in any way, but instead proposed
adding another
$7.5 million to the federation's existing political
2 8
program. 0
Reviewing the proposals suggested by CTW and the AFLCIO's counterproposals, there does not appear to be much
difference between the two in ideological terms. 2 9 The AFL-CIO
leadership offered to embrace organizing reforms, at least in part,
by shifting union funds earmarked for political action to
organizing. On the other hand, the AFL-CIO did not seem
committed to coordinated bargaining and union consolidation to
counteract giant, multinational employers, and did not indicate that
it would change its political methodology. The modest changes
the AFL-CIO was willing to accept were not enough for the five
unions in the Change to Win Coalition - SEIU, Teamsters, UFCW,
UNITE HERE, and LIUNA - and, therefore, they disaffiliated
from the AFL-CIO and joined with the Carpenters2 10 and United
Farm Workers 211 to form a separate labor organization to be known
as Change to Win.
V. REUNITING AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVELS

Before departing the AFL-CIO, the Change to Win
Coalition had contemplated the problems that disaffiliation would
create for AFL-CIO central labor councils and state federations, as
207

Herman Benson, A fine feud with no fighting!, UNION DEMOCRACY REV.

(Ass'n for Union Democracy, Brooklyn, N.Y.), Sept./Oct. 2005, at 2.
208 CTW Proposal, supra note 191.
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labour movement, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 12, 2005, BUSINESS, at 4.
210 The Carpenters departed the AFL-CIO in 2001. Steven Greenhouse, Labor
Leader Offers Locals 'Solidarity',N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at A21.
211 The Farm Workers officially left the AFL-CIO in January 2006. Will Lester,
United Farm Workers leave AFL-CIO to join new group, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2006, availableat
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqn4155/is_20060113/ai_n 16010416
(last visited May 8, 2006).
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CTW unions participated in such labor groups. 2 12 In regards to
state and local labor federations, the coalition stated the following:
Affiliated labor organizations shall support each
other's right to continued participation in central
labor councils or state federations, regardless of
each other's affiliation status with the AFL-CIO.
Where they share membership in any of these
bodies, they shall continue to work together to forge
one unified voice within
the labor movement at the
213

state and local levels.

Therefore, CTW expressed its intention to remain within state and
local labor federations affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
In October 2005, it appeared that the AFL-CIO and CTW
unions had agreed upon special "solidarity charters" that would
allow the CTW unions to remain within state and local labor
federations. 2 The AFL-CIO and CTW are still ironing out the
details, but under the solidarity charters, Change to Win local
unions "will make per capita tax payments based on their
membership to. local and state AFL-CIO organizations at the rates

applicable to other affiliated local unions.
212

215

In return, the CTW

Constitution and Bylaws of the Change to Win Coalition, art. III, § 4,

availableat
http;//www.workinglife.org/FOL/news/ChangeToWinCoalitionconstitution.doc
(last visited May 4, 2006) [hereinafter CTW Bylaws]. It should be noted that
there are two documents that purport to be the Change to Win Constitution. The
above document was composed in June 2005, when the Teamsters, SEIU,
UNITE HERE, UFCW and LIUNA were still affiliated with the AFL-CIO. The
actual Change to Win Constitution, adopted on September 27, 2005, can be
located at http://www.workinglife.org/FOL/news/CTWConstitution.pdf (last
visited Dec. 7, 2005).
213 CTW Bylaws, supranote 212, art. Ill,
§ 4.
214 Moberg, Labor's New Land, supra note 13, at 25.
215 AFL-CIO Rolls Out Solidarity Charter Program to Reunite Local Labor
Movements, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/ns08262005.cfm?elink (last updated
Nov. 22, 2005).
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unions will be granted the same rights as other affiliated local
unions, including the ability to participate in political programs and
the governance of the state or local labor group. 216 Moreover,
Change to Win affiliates that agree to the solidarity charters' terms
will support organizing campaigns, strikes, and other activities of
unions in their jurisdiction, and will agree not to raid AFL-CIO
217
unions that participate in the state or local labor federation.
Even though the details of solidarity charters are not
complete, the CTW unions that are no longer part of the AFL-CIO
national union continue to work with AFL-CIO affiliates.218 For
example, in September 2005, SEIU and the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") signed a
two-year "no-raiding pact" covering the organizing of home and
child care workers in California and Pennsylvania. 219 Under the
agreement, SEIU and AFSCME will jointly organize 25,000 home
care workers in California,220 and will form statewide unions in
California and Pennsylvania; the two unions "will split a portion 22of1
the dues typically paid to the (AFL-CIO) national union."
Though SEIU and AFSCME are working together, the Teamsters
in Chicago have initiated raids on two different AFL-CIO affiliated
unions since CTW was formed.2 22 Therefore, it is unclear if the
SEIU-AFSCME no-raid pact establishes a standard for future
cooperation between Change to Win and the unions that remain
within the AFL-CIO.
In view of the solidarity charters and some cooperation
between CTW and AFL-CIO unions, the current split in organized
labor seems to be "a fine feud with no fighting." 223 It has been
argued that CTW could have done everything it wanted to do from
within the AFL-CIO and that a formal split was unnecessary. To a
2161d.
2 17

id.

218 Benson, supra note 207, at 1.

Thomas B. Edsall, Unions Forge a 'No-Raid' Agreement, WASH. POST, Sept.
20, 2005, at D03 [hereinafter Edsall, No-RaidAgreement].
220 Benson, supra note 207, at 2.
221 Edsail, No-Raid Agreement, supra note 219.
222 Moberg, Labor'sNew Land, supra note 13, at 25.
223 Benson, supra note 207, at 2.
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certain extent this argument is true, because CTW could have
targeted the service sectors with voluntary coordinated bargaining
while retaining its affiliation with the AFL-CIO. Even though the
AFL-CIO offered to return dues money to the CTW unions with a
demonstrated commitment to organizing, such as SEIU and
UNITE HERE, 224 a fair portion of the $39 million CTW would
have contributed in dues to the AFL-CIO would not be returned
and would be spent, in CTW's view, imprudently on lobbying for
federal legislative reform. Considering that CTW believes workers
225
and unions can emerge victorious without changes in labor law,
continuing to spend money on lobbying for federal legislative
reform would be unproductive and a waste of resources that
otherwise could be allocated to organizing. Therefore, the CTW
unions saw disaffiliation as the only way to get control over their
finances and make organizing the number one priority, which
CTW believes is necessary to change organized labor's fortune.
Both the AFL-CIO and Change to Win unions recognized that
organizing efforts had to increase, but the CTW unions seemed to
embrace this fact to a greater degree, thus explaining the
disaffiliation.
More importantly, the creation of the independent Change
to Win federation may have been designed to send a message to
employers, government and the courts. Labor history indicates
that the legal system and the federal government only respond
favorably to workers' interests when unions are perceived as
26 By breaking away from the AFL-CIO, Change to
powerful.
Win has made
a bold statement that employers and government
224 SEIU and UNITE HERE spend half of their international budgets on

organizing new members. See Moberg, Labor'sNew Land,supra note 13, at 25;
Bernstein, Save Labor, supranote 7.
225 See David Moberg, All Apart Now: Unions sacrificesolidarity in their quest
to be more effective, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at 26, 27 [hereinafter
Moberg, All Apart].
226 Atleson, Union Power, supra note 3, at 500; see DUBOFSKY, supra note 10,
at 257.
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should take notice, because organized labor will not continue to
just roll over and let its enemies take advantage of American
workers. Employers and their attorneys seem to realize that a
revitalized labor movement is materializing, and they are preparing
for the "new, aggressive union world" that will place "significant
pressure on employers...227
In addition, CTW's actions may have been aimed at the
labor movement itself. Looking back on labor history, the CIO's
departure from the AFL swayed the established AFL to break
tradition and organize industrial workers. Had the rival CIO not
developed, the AFL's rejection of industrial unionism may have
led to a deterioration of organized labor similar to today - even
with a strong NLRA in the late 1930s. Along the same lines, the
AFL-CIO has already started to respond to its rival Change to Win
228
by expressing a renewed commitment to coordinated organizing.
The AFL-CIO might not have reacted in the same way if the CTW
unions did not disaffiliate. Even though the AFL-CIO and CTW
are reuniting at the state and local levels, it does not mean CTW's
actions were misguided. On the contrary, the disaffiliation was
necessary to awaken the sleeping labor movement.
VI. CHANGE TO WIN AND ITS ORGANIZING STRATEGIES
On September 27, 2005, the Change to Win Coalition held
its founding convention 229 and changed the name of the "alliance"
to Change to Win.230
At this convention, CTW adopted its
227

See, e.g., Andrew P. Marks, Gavin S. Appleby, & Gerald T. Hathaway, The

Splitting of the AFL-CIO: What It Means to the Nation's Employers, ASAP
(Littler Mendelson, P.C.), Aug. 2005, available at http://www.littler.com (last
visited Dec. 7, 2005).
228 Moberg, Labor'sNew Land,supra note 13, at 24. In October 2005, the AFLCIO launched an "industry coordinating committee" to develop a common
organizing and bargaining strategy for 10 unions in the telecommunications,
media, arts and entertainment industries, and is planning to create more such
committees. Id.
229 Healey, supra note 1,at 1.
230
Change to Win Constitution, art. I, available at
http://www.workinglife.org/FOL/news/CTWConstitution.pdf (last visited Dec.
7, 2005) [hereinafter CTW Constitution]. This is the actual Change to Win
Constitution, adopted at the first CTW convention on September 27, 2005.
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constitution, which focuses on "organiz[ing] workers now as the
the
force for economic, political, and social change." 231 In
Change to Win Constitution, the member unions expressed the
organization's mission:
We believe that only an active, focused and
growing union movement can give voice to
workers' dreams and desires, balance unchecked
corporate power and greed, generate economic
growth with a fair share for those who work, put the
concerns of working families at the forefront of
community and national political agendas, and
bring hope for a better future to workers and their
children. 32
The workers CTW seeks to organize are low-wage service sector
groups the
workers, including immigrants, women, and minorities,
233
AFL-CIO has had difficulty organizing for years.
To reduce costs so that maximum funds could be spent on
organizing, CTW decided to employ minimal staff and no full-time
officers, 234 an organizational structure that is much different from
the beefed-up AFL-CIO bureaucracy. 235 None of the members of
the Leadership Council - CTW's principal governing body
comprised of the principal officers of the seven CTW affiliates and
three at-large members elected by the other members of the
231

Id. at art. II,§ 1.
Id. at pmbl.
233 See Thomas B. EdsalI, Anna Burger to Head Breakaway Labor Group:
232

Coalition Hopes to Reverse Setbacks and Organize More Women and
Minorities, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2005, at A7 [hereinafter Edsall, Anna
Burger]; Steven Greenhouse, Union Claims Texas Victory With Janitors, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Greenhouse, Janitors].
234 Moberg, Labor's New Land, supranote 13, at 24.
235 Moberg, Labor's New Land, supra note 13, at 24. The exodus of the CTW
unions will force adjustments to the organizational and financial structure of the
AFL-CIO. Id.
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Leadership Council - are compensated by CTW, nor are the CTW
236
Chair Anna Burger or Secretary-Treasurer Edgar Romney.
What is especially interesting and different from the AFL-CIO is
that CTW is headed by Burger and Romney, the first woman and
African-American to head an American labor federation,
respectively. 237 By electing two individuals who represent the
groups of workers Change to Win looks to organize, CTW denotes
that it is different from the white male leadership of the AFL-CIO
and will welcome female and minority workers.
The Change to Win Constitution is a product of CTW's
commitment to organizing. Based on the "per capita tax of 25
cents per member per month" authorized by the constitution,
CTW's initial budget will be $16 million; 238 at least three-quarters
of those funds will be dedicated to organizing.2 3 9 CTW affiliates
have stated that they will devote another $23 million - the money
saved by disaffiliating from the AFL-CIO - to organizing. 240 In
addition, the CTW Constitution authorizes the collection of funds
from affiliates participating in organizing campaigns on a
"monthly or periodic basis, based on the relative per capita of the
affiliates involved in the campaign and the anticipated increased
membership expected to result from the campaign." 241 Therefore,
CTW estimates that a total of $750 million will be spent on
organizing, 242 an impressive amount in comparison to the $22.5
236

CTW Constitution, supra note 230, art. V, §§ 2, 5, art. VI, § 3. The three at-

large members of the Leadership Council are Burger of SEIU, Romney of
UNITE HERE, and Geralyn Lutty of UFCW. See Eric Lekus, Constitution of
Change to Win Federation Commits 75 Percent of Taxes to Organizing, 19 LAB.
RELATIONS WK 1309 (2005). The Leadership Council members, Chair, and
Secretary-Treasurer all have official positions with the member unions and,
accordingly, are paid by the union to which they belong.
237 See New Labor Federation Pledges to Carry Out Most Aggressive
Organizing Campaign in 50 Years, SEIU Local 1984,
http://www.seiu1984.org/newsstories/ctw_20050927.cfm (last visited Dec. 19,
2005); Lekus, supra note 236.
238 CTW Constitution, supra note 229, art. XI, § 2.
239 Id. at art. XI, § 5.
240 Lekus, supra note 236.
241 CTW Constitution, supra note 230, art. XI, § 5.
242 Tucker, supra note 130.
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million the AFL-CIO budgeted for organizing in 2005.243 Taking
into account conventional organizing standards, the CTW
expenditures should result in 750,000 new union members per
year. 244 In recent years, organizing efforts by all unions have led
to only 500,000 or fewer new members each year, 245 and unions
have been unable to reverse the decline in union membership,
which from 2003 to 2004 fell by 247,000 in the private sector and
304,000 overall.246 In addition to the $750 million in organizing
funds, which are CTW's own organizing monies, the individual
CTW unions
are expected to spend even greater amounts on
24 7
organizing.
The decision on how to spend CTW organizing funds
resides with the established Strategic Organizing Center ("SOC"),
subject to the approval of the Leadership Council.248 The purpose
of the SOC is to "conduct appropriate strategic research to assist
affiliates and the alliance in effectively targeting and allocating
organizing resources with respect to both individual and multibe0
union campaigns." 249 All SOC organizing decisions must 25
effect.
into
going
before
Council
approved by the Leadership
Moreover, CTW has created Sector Coordinating Committees to
coordinate organizing plans, bargaining goals, and contract
standards for principal industries in which CTW affiliates currently
represent or seek to represent workers, so that it can avoid the
undercutting and overlapping that pervade the AFL-CIO.25 '
Some observers are skeptical of CTW's declared
243
244

Moberg, Labor'sNew Land,supra note 13, at 24.
Id. at 25.

245 Id.

246
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commitment to organizing. Looking at the individual unions in
Change to Win, there is a disparity in organizing expenditures.
Although SEIU and UNITE HERE spend considerable amounts on
organizing and have had success, other CTW unions like the
Teamsters and UFCW have exhibited less of a commitment to
organizing and "have been unable to organize more new members
than they lose to offshoring and other employment cutbacks every
year... 252 This criticism should be noted, but dismissed, because
CTW's organizational structure with the SOC and sector
coordinating committees demonstrates that all seven CTW unions
will spend on organizing. In regards to membership decline of
CTW unions, since CTW will be targeting the growing service
sectors and jobs that cannot be offshored or digitized, 253 CTW
should be able to build upon any gains it makes. The process may
be slow and steady, but the Change to Win unions, armed with
innovative organizing tactics, will be able to make progress in
breathing life back into the labor movement.
In terms of organizing strategy, a key aspect of CTW's plan
is to "organiz[e] according to industry and occupation" 254 - a
policy which reflects the organizing tactics of Andy Stern and the
1.8 million-member SEIU. Rather than organize one employer at a
time, Stern has set out to organize entire markets at once.2" 5 This
strategy of "targeting whole areas and industries" allows unions to
"coordinat[e] their efforts against market forces that drive
companies to undercut each other," and has proved successful.2 5 6
For example, SEIU targeted 10,000 nonunion janitors in 11 New
Jersey counties by formulating an agreement with the janitorial
contracting companies whereby the contractors would not have to
raise workers' pay until SEIU signed up 55 percent of the janitors
in the area.2 57 When SEIU reached the 55 percent target in 2001,

Moberg, Labor'sNew Land,supra note 13, at 25.
id.
254 CTW Constitution, supra note 230, pmbl.
255 Bai, supra note 200, at 42.
256 Bernstein, Save Labor, supra note 7.
257 Id.; see also Bai, supra note 200, at 42.
252
253
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the union contracts took effect. 258

Through its efforts, SEIU

helped raise janitorial wages from a little more than minimum
wage to $11.75 an hour plus benefits, and now SEIU represents
259
about 70 percent of those previously nonunion janitors.
According to the vice-president of one custodial services company,
the benefits of unionization include reduction in turnover,
and the removal of wage
increased worker dedication and loyalty,
260
contractors.
janitorial
by
undercutting
As demonstrated in the New Jersey organizing campaign,
SEIU's organizing strategies include card checks, where employers
agree to recognize a union when a majority of workers have signed
union authorization cards. 26 By enlisting the process of card
checks, Stern and SEIU have avoided the National Labor Relations
Board's formal election process, in which management can easily
influence the outcome through legal and illegal labor practices.
Card checks go hand-in-hand with neutrality agreements, which
restrict employers from campaigning against a union during
organizing drives and require an employer to recognize the union
when a majority signs up. 263 In 2005, SEIU obtained neutrality
and card check agreements for over 5,000 janitors in Houston,

258

Bernstein, Save Labor, supra note 7.

259

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
263 Moberg, All Apart Now, supra note 225, at 27; Richard M. Reice &
260
261
262

Christopher Berner, Unions favor card check recognition in organizing, NAT'L

L.J.,

Jan.

10,

2005,

available

at

http://www.brownraysman.com/pubs/articles/pdf/NLJ050110.pdf (last visited
Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Reice, Card Check]. Under a neutrality agreement,
an employer and union can negotiate over various conditions, including what
constitutes a majority for recognition purposes. For example, the parties may
determine that obtaining cards from 55 percent of all eligible employees will
constitute a majority, rather than the simple majority required by the NLRA. See
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Texas, who were backed by janitors in unionized cities. 264 UNITE
neutrality agreements from hotel chains during
HERE also seeks 265
organizing drives.
In current and future organizing drives, Change to Win
plans to target low-wage workers and immigrants, particularly in
the Southern states. 266 Over the years, labor organizations have
had little success organizing in the South; however, SEIU's latest
triumph in Houston may be an indication of what's to come. After
securing a neutrality pledge from Houston's largest janitorial
companies, SEIU organizers announced in late November 2005
SEIU's
that the union had obtained majority support. 267
unprecedented success in Houston can be attributed to "several
unusual tactics," including "lining up the support of religious
leaders, pension funds, and [Houston's] mayor, Bill White, a
Democrat," and "sympathy strikes" in Houston and at 75 office
268
buildings in California, Illinois, New York and Connecticut.
SEIU hopes to build upon its Houston effort by unionizing 4,000
janitors in Atlanta and 2,000 in Phoenix. 269 Although the Houston
effort went smoother than expected, organizing in the South may
still be problematic considering the strong opposition SEIU has
faced from condominium companies in Miami. 27°
Part of the CTW organizing strategy is to "unit[e] workers
2 71
across national borders," i.e., to create a global labor movement.
The economic world workers face today is a place where global

264

Moberg, All Apart Now, supra note 225, at 27.
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2 72
corporations dominate and global labor markets are the norm.
Andy Stern has suggested an international approach that includes
the creation of a multinatiorial federation of unions - an association
similar to the AFL-CIO or CTW, but with member unions coming
from all over the world - designed to combat the effects of
globalization and the challenge posed by multinational
corporations.
International organizing strategies that target
multinational companies based out of France, Great Britain and the
Scandinavian countries have already begun to work for CTW
unions, such as SEIU and UNITE HERE. 274 For instance, Stem
managed to bring Sodexho - a French company that operates in
both France and the United States, and provides the various
"services necessary to operate corporate buildings" - to the
bargaining table by placing advertisements in French
newspapers. 27 5 The ads shamed Sodexho executives, who do not
oppose unions in Europe, for their policy in the United States of
discouraging unionization. 276 SEIU also enlisted Swedish union
support to secure a neutrality pledge from Securitas, a
corporation, for organizing
multinational building security
2 77
States.
United
the
in
campaigns
A multinational labor movement is not a new concept, and
a type of international labor association already exists. In 1949,
the International Conference of Free Trade Unions ("ICFTU") was
Unlike the
created to link unions around the world.278
multinational federation of unions that Stern suggests, which
would include national labor unions, the ICTFU membership
consists of national union centers in each country. 279 The existing
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ICTFU has helped facilitate transnational solidarity; however,
transnational solidarity can be problematic, as some nations like
the United States and Germany prohibit sympathy strikes and
secondary labor activity within and outside national borders. 280 At
the same time, identifying sympathetic action is not always easy,
which means unions can and will continue to cross borders and
enlist the assistance of foreign labor unions.2 8 1 Moreover, the right
to engage in solidarity and sympathy strikes is protected in a
number of European nations, including Sweden, France, Spain, and
Denmark, and, therefore, CTW will be able to utilize relationships
with foreign labor unions as an organizing and bargaining
technique.
Although CTW had indicated that it would "secure
legislation in the common interests of affiliate labor organizations,
their members and all working women and men," 283 legislative
reform and political action on the federal level are not a main focus
for now. As demonstrated by Change to Win's enlisting of local
politicians during the Houston janitorial campaign, whatever
political activity CTW engages in will likely be geared toward the
state and local levels on a non-partisan basis. 284 However, CTW
has already been criticized for its non-partisan position due to past
follies. In 2004, after "SEIU donated $500,000 to the Republican
Governors Association, not a hotbed of pro-union sentiment[,]
[t]hree Republican governors, by executive decree, illegalized
[public sector] collective bargaining." 285 Based on this track
record, SEIU and CTW have been disparaged for their political
stance. Nevertheless, CTW claims that clinging to the Democratic
Party has done nothing for labor of late. 2 86 Backing the New Deal
Democrats did benefit the CIO, but neither of the two major U.S.
political parties can be called a true friend of workers. Therefore,
280
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282 Id. at 158-64.
283

CTW Bylaws, supra note 212, art. II, § 7.
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CTW should align its interest with those politicians who have
unions and workers in the past, regardless
consistently supported
287
of party affiliation.
Ironically, the AFL's original concerns regarding political
action seem to have come back to haunt the AFL-CIO and the
labor movement. In the early 2 0 th century, the AFL followed its
tradition of voluntarism and avoided political action, believing that
organized labor "could not become tied to any political party," and
that government activity would hurt union interests in the long
run. 2 A For years now, the AFL-CIO has been wedded to the
Democratic Party; obviously that policy of voluntarism is long
gone. Considering that advocating for legislative reform and
relying on the Democrats has not worked for the AFL-CIO,
CTW's political strategy and commitment to organizing seems
more rational.
Unlike the AFL-CIO, which continues to push for
legislative change, "[t]he CTW unions argue that even without new
[federal] legislation unions can win new large-scale organizing
campaigns now." 289 However, a piece of pro-labor legislation
known as the Employee Free Choice Act currently has 204
2 90
sponsors in the House of Representatives and 40 in the Senate.
This Act would legally recognize a bargaining unit when a
majority of workers signed authorization cards, create binding
arbitration for the first contract negotiated between a new union
and employer, and increase employer penalties for unfair labor
practices. 29 1 In the past, similar legislation has come close to
Still, the CTW unions will most likely support Democrats, because they have
supported unions and workers in the past.
288 GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, supra note 8, at 94.
289 Moberg, All Apart Now, supra note 225, at 27.
290 Christopher Hayes, Symbol of the System: What do you get when you cross
287
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passing, but has ultimately been defeated 292 and, therefore, CTW is
wise to push forward regardless of what the U.S. government may
or may not do.
Focusing on organizing makes the most sense -right now for
CTW. As John L. Lewis put it, "politicians react[ ] to power, not
sentiment" and workers can "advance their cause only through the
exercise of power . . . , not through appeals for sympathy as
oppressed Americans."
In other words, only when unions are
perceived as powerful does the legal system and government
respond favorably. 294 CTW has already begun to make some noise
with its organizing work in Houston. If Change to Win can build
upon that victory, politicians and the federal government will take
notice, and then CTW can concern itself with labor law reform.
VII. CHANGE TO WIN'S IMPACT ON ORGANIZED LABOR
Much of the debate surrounding Change to Win has been
whether the split from the AFL-CIO was necessary or prudent.
Just as people in the labor movement questioned John L. Lewis'
motives for supporting industrial unionism, today's union leaders
are wary of Andy Stem's reasons for encouraging the formation of
Change to Win. Some labor leaders, including Tom Buffenbarger,
president of the AFL-CIO's International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, view Andy Stem as "an
296
arrogant usurper; 295 a man who is "power-hungry."
Buffenbarger believes that when Stem talks about union density, or
market share, and "loss and gain," Stern "sound[s] so much [more]
like management" than a union leader. 297 Stem's critics also have
doubts about CTW's organizing potential in the "tough-as-nails"
private sector, since much of the SEIU's organizing success has
been in the public sector with "easy-to-organize" home health care
workers. 29 8
Moreover, the top-down organizing approach
292
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advocated by Stem and other CTW leaders is a stark contrast to the
CIO, and has been denounced by Larry Cohen, president of the
AFL-CIO affiliate Communication Workers of America ("CWA),
who believes organized299labor should pursue grassroots organizing
and labor law reforms.
At this point, discussing the reasons for Andy Stem and the
Change to Win unions' disaffiliation from the AFL-CIO is
superfluous. The crucial question is whether CTW can silence its
critics by living up to its hype and achieving similar gains to those
of the CIO in the 1930s. Although comparing the CIO and CTW is
not exactly fair, as the political and economic environment of the
late 1930s is quite distinguishable from that of the early 21st
century, the comparison reveals promise and suggests that CTW
can make some important headway in reviving unionism in the
United States.
The growth of the CIO was rooted in rank-and-file activism
and facilitated by sympathetic politicians at the federal, state, and
local levels of government. It was no coincidence in the 1930s that
organized labor's fate began to improve after pro-labor legislation
was enacted and supportive politicians gained control of the
federal government and various state governorships. In contrast,
the present day federal government is not an ally of labor and the
NLRA is an ineffective piece of legislation that allows employers
to steer clear of unionized workplaces. Moreover, many CIO
members were communist "big picture" activists, 30 0 and it does not
appear that Change to Win leaders can provide a specific idea of
what a just American society should look like. On the surface,
therefore, one would think that a comparison between the CIO and
CTW is unwarranted and reveals little promise for CTW.
Aside from the noticeable political, legislative, and
299
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organizational differences, unions and workers in the early 2 1st
century find themselves in an economic situation quite comparable
to that of the 1930s. In the 1920s and 1930s, the United States was
in the process of moving from a craft-based economy to an
AFL leaders disregarded industrial
industrial economy.
organization because they believed it to be an ineffective form of
unionism, and found industrial workers to be "beneath" craft
workers and, therefore, unworthy candidates for unions. 30 1 The
CIO unions, however, recognized the opportunity associated with
and successfully pursued
the socio-economic transformation 302
industrial unionism on a massive scale.
Similarly, the modem day economy can be described as a
service economy, with much of the former industrial sectors
disappearing and being moved abroad. Like the old AFL, the
AFL-CIO for years essentially ignored the development of a
service economy and put forth little effort into organizing service
workers. 30 3 More likely, AFL-CIO unions dominated by white
men did not perceive the benefit in organizing women and
minorities in the low-wage service industries -who may have been
viewed as "scum" like industrial workers in the 1930s - and
probably304were not well-positioned to mobilize such service
In comparison, the Change to Win unions realized that
workers.
the future of American workers was tied to a service economy
comprised of immigrants, women, and minorities, and, therefore,
workers
has begun its mission to bring unionism to the millions 3of
°5
"ClO.
very
is
that
something
industries
service
in the
Jack Metzgar claims that the CIO and Change to Win are
not one and the same, especially because "the CIO leaders saw an
opportunity [to organize], whereas the [CTW] unions see only a
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dire need. 30 6 There is some truth in that statement. The National
Industrial Recovery Act and then the Wagner Act gave industrial
workers the opportunity to form unions and they jumped at the
chance. Since the antiquated AFL leadership objected to industrial
organization, the rank-and-file workers were merely waiting for a
labor organization to welcome them in. Therefore, John L. Lewis
and the CIO capitalized on the opportunity found in industrial
unionism by forming a rival labor federation in response to
workers' demands.
On the other hand, Change to Win is pretty much a
manifestation of union leaders' reactions to the ongoing
destruction of organized labor. For years, unions have been unable
to reverse labor's decline, which has left organized labor in a dire,
crippled state. Unlike the CIO, Change to Win was not created
because workers were calling for union representation. Rather,
CTW leaders formed a new labor federation because they believed
workers needed to belong to unions in order to protect workers'
rights, interests and future. 30 7 Both the CIO and CTW recognized
that the point of no return for organized labor was rapidly
approaching -'and, in Change to Win's case, it may have already
arrived - and that a massive restructuring of the labor movement
was needed if organized labor and workers wanted to retain any
type of economic and political power. In that sense, CIO and
CTW leaders did play a role in founding new labor federations.
However, the reasons for creating Change to Win came solely
30 8
from the top, with little influence or demand from the bottom.
Therefore, there are dissimilarities between the CIO and
CTW regarding rank-and-file organizing and a top-down approach;
however, they do not matter significantly. Considering the 2 1st
century's political and legal realities, if CTW were a carbon copy
of the CIO, Change to Win would not be able to save organized
306
307
308
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labor. The political obstacles, which translate into weak labor laws
and support for employers' economic interests, prevent Change to
Win from considering the grassroots organizing (at least for the
time being) that30 9allowed the CIO to double union membership in
only two years.
Accordingly, CTW cannot rely on the rank-and-file and
workers' self-activity to resurrect the organized labor movement.
Although polls show that 40 million American workers would like
to join unions 310 and that 40 percent would vote for union
31
representation if an election were held at their workplace, 1
workers are not lining up to join unions. Why is that? According
to Andy Stem, the explanation for workers'
actions and unions'
31 2
inability to organize is simple - employers.
Under existing labor laws, "an employer is free to wage an
aggressive campaign" to dissuade its employees from joining
unions. 313 In those situations where employees do seek union
representation and file an election petition with the NLRB,
employers manage to avoid unionization more than 50 percent of
the time. 314 Three-quarters of employers involved in NLRB
elections hire "union-busting firms" to avoid unionization, 31 5 and
316
25 percent of employers fire union supporters in those elections.
Even if employers' actions are eventually deemed unfair labor
practices by the NLRB, employers view remedies like backpay for
fired employees as a routine business expense. 317 Firing union
supporters during an organizing campaign has a chilling effect on
other employees, who may be considering voting for a union,
because it sends a strong message that they will meet a similar fate
309 See id. at 12.
310
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if they support a union. Employees are thus forced to choose
between a job and no union, or no job and possibly a union.
Seventy percent of the time the employer comes out ahead by
running an anti-union campaign, 318 as it avoids the costs associated
with union representation. Therefore, it is not surprising that union
victories are becoming increasingly rare and that traditional
grassroots organizing, an "arduous, risky and costly" process, 31 9 is
ineffective in bringing unionism to the masses.
Perhaps if Change to Win had the communist presence of
the CIO then today's hostile employers would not be able to
prevent union organizing. The CIO was home to many left-wing
activists, especially communists, who were indifferent to being
fired and were willing to engage in militant battles with
employers. 320 If a sizeable communist or socialist presence existed
in American society or Change to Win, then maybe grassroots
organizing and rebuilding the labor movement from the bottom-up
might be a prudent option. On the other hand, communist
militancy probably would not be able to circumvent the weak labor
laws, which favor employers in union campaigns. Moreover, the
CIO's inclusion of and affiliation with communists contributed to
the CIO's decline in the early 1950s, as the CIO expelled
communist union members in response to society's rejection of
any association with the communist ideology, and so it might be
best that the extreme left is not involved in Change to Win's
organizing mission.
Looking at the Communication Workers of America
("CWA"), communist or socialist ideology does not appear to be
the controlling factor for union organizing success. In the last
twenty years, the CWA, which favors "organiz[ing] from the
318
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workplace up, not the top down" and is not a communist
organization, has used grassroots organizing to increase CWA
membership from 580,000 to 700,000.321 The CWA's grassroots
organizing has been successful because its organizing methods are
coupled with card check recognition and neutrality agreements,
just like the Change to Win unions.
It would seem then that increasing unionization rates will
not be determined by whether unions employ a bottom-up
approach (with or without a presence from the left) or CTW's topdown sector organizing; both organizing strategies can work with
help. What workers and unions need to do to reverse labor's
decline is to secure neutrality and card check arrangements by
various means, including enlisting public support from civic and
religious leaders 32 2 - a tactic the CIO used when trying to organize
black workers. 323 One study shows that when a neutrality
provision is combined with a card check agreement, the union
organizing success rate is almost 80 percent. 324 In contrast, unions
win only 45 percent of NLRB elections, a statistic which does not
include those instances where unions anticipate defeat and
withdraw an election petition. 325 Interestingly, the Change to Win
unions won 60 percent of all NLRB elections in 2004, which
illustrates that CTW does have some of the best strategic
organizers. 326
Still, combining card check recognition with
neutrality agreements is CTW's - and other unions' - best option
because it eliminates employer opposition and, therefore, makes
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327
the unionization process much easier.
Although many American employers are willing to fight
unions tooth and nail, not all employers reject neutrality and card
check agreements. 328 At times, employers consent to neutrality
and card checks to achieve labor peace or gain a union's support
on a key business initiative outside of the employer's control, such
329
as securing public approval for an expansion in operations.
Moreover, unions with significant bargaining power, like Change
to Win's SEIU, are best suited for obtaining neutrality and card
check agreements. 330 Therefore, CTW is on the right path with its
strategy of organizing entire sectors at once through card checks
and neutrality, and should be able to reproduce its Houston victory
in other cities and sectors.
In regards to CTW's method of sector organizing, targeting
whole markets at once is a practical strategy. When unions
succeed in organizing an entire sector, "the presence of a union no
longer puts any particular enterprise at a disadvantage in the
marketplace." 33 Accordingly, by taking on a whole industry in a
certain locality at once, employers should not feel as much
pressure to fight a union and its request for neutrality, since all
companies in that industry will be in the same boat. CTW can use
the organizing examples in New Jersey and now Houston to show
employers and workers that unionization is in no way a bad thing
and does in fact have various benefits, such as reduced employee
the elimination of wage undercutting by rival
turnover and
332
employers.
CTW will be able to win some critical victories with sector
organizing through card check and neutrality agreements, but
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employer opposition to unionism will no doubt remain strong in
the United States, just as it did when the CIO was formed in 1935.
One thing that generated the CIO's massive growth was the ability
to bring General Motors and U.S. Steel, two large, anti-union
employers, to the bargaining table. CTW has already begun to
make significant progress by achieving union recognition for 5,000
janitors in Houston - an accomplishment that speaks volumes in
the anti-union South.333 Although more victories should follow the
Houston campaign, CTW's credibility and the future of organized
labor may have to involve a battle between CTW and a large, antiunion employer - perhaps Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart could be considered CTW's modern day General
Motors or U.S. Steel, as Wal-Mart's position is that unionism is
not permitted in its U.S. stores and the company openly
communicates to its employees that they cannot join unions, in
violation of the NLRA. . Similar to U.S. Steel in the early 2 0th
century, Wal-Mart instructs its store managers to contact corporate
headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas via the "Wal-Mart Hotline"
33 5
when employees display the slightest sign of union support.
Wal-Mart's anti-union policy and methods are not a secret, nor are
its violations of federal labor laws and its poor treatment of
employees. Since 1999, unions and workers have filed more than
300 unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB accusing Walviolations as firing employees for suspected union
Mart of33such
6
activity.
As Change to Win indicated in its proposals to the AFLCIO, a massive campaign to take on Wal-Mart and other antiworker employers is needed. If Change to Win managed to force
Wal-Mart to the bargaining table, it would not only add one
million Wal-Mart employees to the ranks of organized labor, but it
could spark a wave of mass organization reminiscent of the CIO in
the 1930s. One obstacle, though, is that CTW cannot use
neutrality agreements and card checks to force Wal-Mart to
333 Greenhouse, Janitors,supra note 233.
334 For U.S. Steel's anti-union position, see
335 Hayes, supra note 290, at 22.
336 id.

infra p. 4 and note 21.
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negotiate because Wal-Mart will categorically reject these union
requests. Since CTW's typical organizing methods and the
traditional store-by-store strategy or rank-and-file organizing
cannot work with Wal-Mart, Change to Win has taken a different
approach and decided to go after "the hearts and minds of [Walhas
launched
The
UFCW
Mart's]
customers." 337
WakeUpWalMart.com, "a public awareness campaign designed to
educate the public about Wal-Mart's [harmful] business impact
and negative community effects," 338 and has provided legal
339
support to communities trying to fight off new Wal-Mart stores.
called
a
similar
movement
helped
start
SEIU
340
WalMartWatch.com.
With the Change to Win unions engaged in corporate
campaigns that criticize Wal-Mart and its business practices, some
observers believe the groundwork is being laid for a successful
organizing effort against Wal-Mart. 34 1 Tom Weir notes that
"[v]ery little could have as much publicity value [for Change to
Win] as forcing Wal-Mart to the bargaining table," and that WalMart "may be helping the union cause with the way it's been
addressing employee issues." 342 In fact, due to discontent with low
wages and poor working conditions, employee associations made
the United
up of Wal-Mart workers are springing up throughout
343
In central Florida,
States with the help of the UFCW and SEIU.
Can Wal-Mart change its spots?, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 17, 2005,
at A49.
338 Hayes, supra note 290, at 22.
339 Bill Sheets, Wal-Martfoes press on, THE DAILY HERALD (Wash.), Dec. 19,
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for example, Wal-Mart employees have formed the Wal-Mart
Workers Association, headed by SEIU organizer Rick Smith,344 "to
publicly raise complaints about the way members are treated at
work, especially with regard to scheduling and cutbacks in hours
they say put their health benefits at risk. 345 Though this
association is not technically a union, the Wal-Mart employees'
concerns sound a lot like the concerted activity that leads to
unionization, and the association, which collects monthly dues
from its members, 346 may be a step in that direction.
CONCLUSION
Change to Win does not have to be exactly like the CIO in
order to rescue workers and protect them from vicious employers
and unsympathetic politicians. CTW does not need an overriding
vision of what American society should look like or a bottom-up
approach.347 Arguably, it is enough that Change to Win is willing
to do what is necessary to promote and improve the economic
interests of American workers and their children, and give working
families a strong political voice. 348 The fact that CTW appears to
be ready to fight for workers' rights at any cost may be sufficient
to help unions grow once again.
Excluding any noticeable differences between the CIO and
CTW, the two labor organizations are alike in one important way:
both recognized that without a change in union organizing strategy,
349
unions would fall into "political and economic irrelevance."
Consequently, the individuals affiliated with the two labor
federations were willing to do what was necessary, within the
http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=showitem&itemid=2572
visited Dec. 19, 2005); Benson, supra note 207, at 2.
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political and economic confines of American society, to bring
unionism to the millions of unorganized workers in the United
States. As it turned out, the CIO's departure from the AFL was the
right move. Likewise, the formation of Change to Win may turn
out to be exactly what the organized labor movement needs. Only
time will tell if Change to Win and service sector workers will
emerge victorious in their confrontation with anti-union
employers; but workers should be hopeful because a revitalized
labor movement is developing and gaining ground.
Change to Win's journey might not be as easy as the CIO's
considering contemporary labor law and the current political
environment, both of which operate against workers and unions.
Change to Win should not be expected to double union
membership in a matter of two years 350 or have the immediate
impact that the CIO's industrial unionism had. However, CTW's
massive organizing expenditures, commitment to organizing the
service sectors, and creative organizing tactics, including
organizing entire sectors or markets at once, should allow the new
labor federation to increase union membership and union density
ever so steadily. Since CTW will be organizing the growing
service industries in which the jobs cannot be offshored or replaced
with technology, any progress Change to Win makes should be
sustainable.
With no-raid agreements and solidarity charters
maintaining relationships between AFL-CIO affiliates and CTW
unions, organized labor has not been divided. Solidarity will
continue on the local and state levels, and that is good news for
workers. Even though some may argue that this reunification
proves the CTW disaffiliation was unwarranted, the opposite is
probably true. By breaking away from the AFL-CIO, Change to
Win not only alerted employers and politicians that a revitalized
would be nearly impossible, as there are 8 million union members in the
private sector. See http://www.iraonline.org/charts.php?id=53 (last visited May
350 This
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labor movement is developing, but it also sent a message to the
AFL-CIO to wake up and change.
Ten years ago, the AFL-CIO recognized the problem of
union decline but did not make a genuine attempt at figuring out a
solution. Considering the AFL in the 1930s and the present day
AFL-CIO, organized labor has a pattern of rebuffing change, even
when it is needed. Only when an actual division takes place within
organized labor does the AFL-CIO seem to react. Given this
history, CTW's decision to depart from the AFL-CIO was essential
for workers, and also to convince the AFL-CIO leadership to
change its organizing strategy.
When the CIO started to organize along industrial lines, it
ended up being a turning point for organized labor, as it caused the
AFL to do away with its antiquated jurisdictional system and
spurred massive union organization. Change to Win has started to
fulfill its organizing mission, and the AFL-CIO has begun to show
signs of change. If the history of the AFL and CIO is indicative of
what happens when there is a split in the labor movement,
notwithstanding the political and legal differences of the 1930s and
early 2 1st century, Change to Win's actions may represent a critical
turning point for organized labor and a sign of better days to come.

